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Abstract
This paper examines the relative savings position of migrant households in
West Germany,paying particular attention to differences between temporary
andpermanentmigrants.Ourfindingsrevealsignificantdifferencesinthesav-
ings rates between foreign-born and German-born individuals. These differ-
ences disappear, however, for temporary migrants, if their remittances are
taken into account. The results of a decomposition analysis indicate that dif-
ferencesinthesavingsratebetweenGermansandforeignerscanmainlybeat-
tributedtodifferencesinobservablecharacteristics.Wedonotfindstrongevi-
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Due to the growing number of immigrants worldwide, the economic performance
of the foreign-born population and the integration of immigrant minorities into the
host-country’s society have become increasingly important. So far, the economic
literature on the assimilation of immigrants concentrates predominantly on earnings
and employment adjustment patterns (Borjas 1994)1. Only a few studies examine
the relative savings position of the foreign-born population, although the savings
level represents an important measure of the overall economic well-being, inﬂuencing
the possibilities of immigrants to participate in the economic, social and political life
of their host country (Cobb-Clark and Hildebrand 2002). The long-term integration
process of immigrant minorities, however, also depends on the savings behavior and
hence the wealth accumulation of immigrants. This is especially important in an
ageing society with a pay-as-you go pension system, because private savings have
become increasingly relevant to supplement public pensions after retirement.
Germany, the major immigration country in the European Union, is an excellent
example of the importance of savings for the long-term integration of immigrants.
In the 1960s and 1970s, a large number of ”temporary” guest workers – mainly
labor migrants from Southern Europe – were encouraged to migrate to Germany.
Many of them, however, decided to stay in Germany permanently (Bauer, Dietz,
Zimmermann, and Zwintz 2005). The savings level and the resulting wealth position
of these guest workers may become an important factor of the German integration
policy, because a major part of this group of migrants is reaching retirement age
within the next decade.
Several arguments suggest the existence of savings disparities between immi-
grants and the native-born population. Firstly, diﬀerences in the savings behavior
1The evidence for Germany is summarized by Bauer, Dietz, Zimmermann, and Zwintz (2005).
1between natives and immigrants may be caused by the original migration motive
of immigrants. Diﬀerent to permanent migrants, temporary migrants may want to
accumulate more savings in order to improve their economic situation upon their re-
turn to the home country. Hence, it seems to be important to diﬀerentiate between
temporary and permanent migrants and to take the remittances of migrants into ac-
count when analyzing diﬀerences in the savings behavior of immigrants and natives.
Secondly, diﬀerences in the savings patterns and wealth position may be caused by
diﬀerences in the socioeconomic background between natives and immigrants such
as, for example, diﬀerences in the cultural and economic background or skill diﬀer-
ences. The latter may be responsible for diﬀerences in the economic performance
of immigrants and natives and consequently the possibilities to accumulate savings.
Finally, savings disparities between natives and immigrants may be the results of
regulations concerning the access to social welfare programs or discrimination by
ﬁnancial institutions.
This paper aims at providing a comprehensive analysis of the savings behavior
of immigrants relative to natives using German data. In this endeavor, we pay
special attention to the relative importance of remittances and control for diﬀerences
between permanent and temporary migrants. Speciﬁcally, the following research
questions will be addressed in this paper: Are there diﬀerences in the savings rate
between immigrants and natives? Which factors determine the savings rate? Do
we observe a savings assimilation process? Do remigration plans of immigrants
aﬀect their savings behavior? What is the relative importance of remittances in
the context of wealth accumulation? Which part of the savings diﬀerential can be
attributed to diﬀerences in the characteristics of immigrants and natives and which
part is due to a diﬀerent savings behavior?
We use household information drawn from the German Socio-Economic Panel
2(GSOEP) of the years 1996 - 2003 which contain comparable information about the
remittances of immigrants. In our analysis, we apply diﬀerent estimation strategies
to account for the large number of households who do not save at all. In partic-
ular, we estimate diﬀerent empirical speciﬁcations of OLS, Tobit, and ﬁxed eﬀects
OLS and Tobit models to investigate the savings gap and the assimilation process
of immigrants in Germany. Particular attention is paid to the diﬀerences in the
savings behavior between temporary and permanent migrants. We further apply
the decomposition method proposed by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) for linear
models and develop a similar decomposition method for Tobit models to isolate the
part of the savings diﬀerential that can be explained by diﬀerences in socioeconomic
characteristics from the part attributable to diﬀerences in the savings behavior.
Our ﬁndings reveal signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the savings rate between foreigners
and Germans. However, these diﬀerences disappear when taking the remittances
of migrants who intend to stay only temporarily into account. The decomposition
of the savings diﬀerential shows that savings disparities are mainly the result of
diﬀerences in socioeconomic characteristics rather than diﬀerences in the savings
behavior of immigrants and natives. This result implies that distinctions in the
savings rates mainly reﬂect disparities in observable factors, such as age, education,
permanent income, and the number of children. Since our ﬁndings do not provide
strong evidence for an assimilation process of savings rates between natives and
immigrants, our results suggest deﬁcits in the long-term integration of permanent
migrants in Germany.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a short survey of the exist-
ing literature on the savings behavior of migrants. Section 3 presents the empirical
strategy of our analysis and describes the data drawn from the GSOEP. The esti-
mation results of our analysis are presented in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
32 The Savings Diﬀerential between Natives and
Immigrants
From a theoretical point of view, diﬀerences in the saving patterns between immi-
grants and natives may be caused by a variety of factors. Firstly, diﬀerent savings
behavior may be caused by the migration motive. Galor and Stark (1990) argue, for
example, that the remigration probability of immigrants in the host country is higher
than the migration probability of comparable natives. They use an overlapping-
generations model to show that the higher probability of remigration increases the
saving propensity of immigrants. This argument suggests, that it may be important
to distinguish between temporary and permanent migrants when investigating the
savings behavior of immigrants relative to natives, with temporary migrants saving
more than permanent migrants and natives.
Following the literature on migration that occurs for risk-diversiﬁcation within
families2, Dustmann (1997) develops a model in which immigrants’ duration abroad
and savings are jointly determined. He demonstrates that immigrants may accu-
mulate more precautionary savings than comparable natives if they face greater
income risk on the labor market of the host country. However, Dustmann (1997)
also argues that the lifelong income risk of immigrants may be smaller than the
income risk of natives, if immigrants are able to diversify labor market risks across
countries. In this case, precautionary savings of immigrants may be lower than
those of natives. Supporting this hypothesis, Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2002)
ﬁnd lower savings rates for immigrants than for natives. They argue, however, that
the apparent lower precautionary savings of immigrants may be caused by the fact
that immigrants engage in precautionary saving by remitting part of their income
2See Stark (1991).
4to their home countries.
To explore this issue further, Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2004) pay particu-
lar attention to the determinants of home remittances. Using data on Mexican
immigrants in the United States, they ﬁnd that a higher income risk3 leads to
increased remittances of immigrants. Using data for Germany, Merkle and Zim-
mermann (1992) ﬁnd that remigration plans represent an important determinant of
remittances. However, they do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of remigration plans on
the savings behavior. Based on these results, they conclude that temporary migrants
hold savings mainly in their home country.
Savings disparities may also be caused by the fact that immigrants represent a
highly selected group of people. It is well known that because of self-selection and the
immigration policies of the receiving countries immigrants are neither representative
for the population in the home nor for the population in the host country. Therefore,
savings disparities may exist because of diﬀerences in the socioeconomic and cultural
background. Skill diﬀerences, for example, may be responsible for diﬀerences in the
economic performance of immigrants and natives (Chiswick 1978, Borjas 1987), and
hence savings rates.
Cobb-Clark and Hildebrand (2002) argue that individuals in the sending country
may have certain social norms and expectations about intergenerational transfers
which can inﬂuence the amount of inherited wealth and consequently the post-
migration savings behavior. These norms and expectations may lead to diﬀerences
in the savings behavior between immigrants and natives as well as within the het-
erogenous immigrant population. Using data of the Survey of Income Program
Participation (SIPP), they show that foreign-born households in the United States
3Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2004) use proxies for income risk, such as immigrants’ legal status
or access to social networks.
5are less wealthy than their U.S.-born counterparts. Their ﬁndings further indicate
that the diversity in wealth levels can be attributed primarily to diﬀerences be-
tween source-regions rather than diﬀerences between entry-cohorts. Carroll, Rhee,
and Rhee (1999) also ﬁnd diﬀerences in the saving patterns of immigrants across
countries of origin. However, they demonstrate that these patterns do not resemble
the national saving patterns in the sending countries because of immigrant selectiv-
ity variations across sending regions, indicating that savings disparities within the
immigrant population do not reﬂect cultural diﬀerences.
Some empirical studies analyze only a speciﬁc part of the overall savings port-
folio. Most of these studies concentrate on home ownership. Borjas (2002), for
example, examines the home-ownership of the immigrant population in the United
States. He demonstrates that immigrants are less likely than natives to own a house
and that the home-ownership gap has widened between 1980 and 2000. The es-
timation results of Painter, Yang, and Yu (2003) reveal that diﬀerences in native
and foreign-born residential patterns may lead to a divergence in the proportion of
wealth held in housing stock. They ﬁnd that most of the diﬀerence in the home-
ownership rates between Asian groups and White households in the United States
can be explained by the higher mobility of Asian households and the concentration
in major metropolitan areas with higher housing prices. Although Cobb-Clark and
Hildebrand (2002) ﬁnd that entry-cohorts do not aﬀect overall wealth levels, they
demonstrate that the year of arrival is signiﬁcantly related to the portfolio choices
of the foreign-born population in the United States.
Not only the cultural background in the home country but also the situation of
immigrants in the host country may diﬀer substantially from that of the native-born
population because of institutional reasons. Shamsuddin and DeVoretz (1998) argue
that immigrants may have limited access to social welfare programs, which could
6impose diﬀerent constraints on the wealth accumulation decisions of immigrants and
natives, leading to an increased savings propensity of immigrants.
3 Data, Empirical Strategy, and Decomposition
Analysis
3.1 Data and Empirical Strategy
In our analysis, we utilize data drawn from the German Socio-Economic Panel
(GSOEP) for the years from 1996 to 20034. Since less than two percent of the
migrant population in the sample lives in East Germany, our analysis concentrates
on West Germany. The empirical analysis is performed on the household level,
because the GSOEP provides savings information only for households. We further
restrict our analysis on household heads aged 16 to 65 years. After excluding all
observations with missing values on one of the variables used in the analysis –
which will be described in more detail below – our panel data set contains 38,885
household-year-observations of 8,034 households.
To investigate diﬀerences in the savings rate between immigrants and natives,
we estimate regression models which resemble the model of Chiswick (1978), who
analyzes the earnings assimilation of immigrants in the United States. Formally, the
4The data used in this paper was extracted from the SOEP Database provided by the DIW
Berlin (http://www.diw.de/soep) using the Add-On package SOEPMENU v1.1 (Sep 2004) for
Stata(R). SOEPMENU was written by Dr. John P. Haisken-DeNew (john@soepmenu.de). The
following authors supplied SOEPMENU Plugins used to ensure longitudinal consistency, John P.
Haisken-DeNew - h2110x h2707x h2743x h2747x h2748x h2817x h3111x p195x p2222x p2292x
p296x p3466x, Mathias Sinning - h2713x p171x p601x p602x p603x p605x p606x p607x p609x
p610x p611x p613x p614x p615x p617x p618x p619x p621x. The SOEPMENU generated DO ﬁle
to retrieve the SOEP data used here and any SOEPMENU Plugins are available upon request.
Any data or computational errors in this paper are our own.
7regression equation can be written as follows:




= Xitβ + εit, (1)
for i =1 ,...,N, t = 1,...,T. Sit measures the savings rate of household i at time t.
To make savings comparable across households of diﬀerent size, we use equivalent
household savings by dividing reported savings of a household with the square root
of the respective household size. Mi is a dummy variable reﬂecting whether the head
of a household immigrated to Germany, and Rit indicates the intend of a household
head with migration background to return to the home country. The speciﬁcation
further includes the number of years since migration and its squared value. The
parameters β4 and β5 indicate how the savings of immigrant households evolve over
the duration of stay in Germany relative to natives.
The vector Zit summarizes additional explanatory variables used to control for
other determinants of savings. In the empirical analysis we will use alternative speci-
ﬁcations of this vector. In its most extensive speciﬁcation, the vector Zit includes the
years of education of the household head, the permanent income of the household,
a dummy variable indicating whether the household owns a house and/or apart-
ment, the number of children in the household, a dummy variable which speciﬁes
whether the household head is employed, a dummy variable indicating a single par-
ent household, and a number of interaction terms between the migrant dummy and
the socioeconomic characteristics. In addition, the vector Zit includes a quadratic of
the age of the household head in a particular period. We include age as a quadratic
function into the regression equation, because we expect an ’U’-shaped path of the
8savings rate over the life cycle5. Finally, Dt represents a vector of year dummies6.
A particular diﬃculty when analyzing savings of immigrants is the treatment
of remittances of immigrant households to their home country. The information
on remittances of foreign households in the GSOEP does not reveal whether these
remittances are consumption related transfers (e.g. payments to increase consump-
tion levels of family members staying in the home country) or whether parts of the
income were transferred to the home country to save or invest money. Consequently,
an assumption about the nature of the remittances has to be made.
Treating all kinds of remittances as altruistic remittances represents one possible
assumption about payments of foreign-born individuals to their home country. In
this case, savings are only represented by savings in the host country (Amuedo-
Dorantes and Pozo 2002). Alternatively, it can be assumed that all remittances
could be treated as investments, which implies that they should be treated as savings.
Finally, it may be assumed that the remittances of immigrants who do not plan to
return to their home country are purely altruistic. In this case, only the remittances
of temporary migrants could be treated as savings, while one has to consider the
consumptive nature of the remittances of permanent migrants. In the empirical
analysis, we will investigate all three possibilities to take remittances of migrants
into account.
Table 1 contains some descriptive statistics on the savings of natives as well
as the savings and remittances of temporary and permanent migrants in our sam-
ple. We deﬁne temporary migrants as migrants who claim to return to their home
country, while migrants who claim that they stay in Germany forever are consid-
ered as permanent migrants. Consequently, the classiﬁcations temporary migrant
5Browning and Lusardi (1996) provide evidence for an ’U’-shaped savings rate-age proﬁle.
6A detailed description of the deﬁnition of the variables used in our analysis is given in Appendix-
Table A1. Appendix-Table A2 contains descriptive statistics.
9and permanent migrant may change over time. The variables Savings and Sav-
ings Equivalent report only savings in Germany, while the variable Savings and
Remittances I (S & R I) reports the savings equivalent when only remittances of
temporary migrants are considered as savings, and Savings and Remittances II (S &
R II) reports the savings equivalent if all remittances of the migrants are treated as
savings. The savings rates represent the ratio between the respective savings level
and the household income equivalent.
Overall, savings rates turn out to be quite stable over time. For natives, the
savings rate varies from 8.1% in 2003 to 9.0% in 2000, with an average of 8.6% over
the entire sample period. Not considering remittances of migrants as savings, the
savings rate of migrants, who plan to return to their home country some time in
the future, varies from 5.2% in 2002 to 8.3% in 2003 with a mean savings rate of
7.0% for the period from 1996 to 2003. Apart from the year 2002, the savings rates
of temporary migrants are substantially higher than those of permanent migrants.
The mean savings rate of the latter ranges from 4.5% in 2003 to 6.6% in 1999 with
a mean of 5.4% for the entire sample period.
It is not surprising, that temporary migrants save more than permanent migrants
in all years covered by our sample, when only remittances of temporary migrants are
considered as savings (S&RI ). However, this picture does not change very much
by treating the remittances of permanent migrants as savings as well (S&RI I ).
Using this savings measure for migrants, temporary migrants save on average 11.8%,
while permanent migrants only save 7.2% of their income in our sample period. The
savings rates of temporary migrants exceed the savings rates of natives when we
treat remittances of migrants as being savings.
The distributions of the savings and remittances rates of natives and migrants
for the year 2003 are shown in Figure 1. A substantial share of the immigrant popu-
10lation does not save at all or saves a relatively small amount. Figure 1b shows again
that temporary migrants save even more than natives, if remittances are taken into
account. Although the consideration of remittances increases the savings rate of
permanent migrants, the savings gap between natives and permanent migrants per-
sists (Figure (1d)). These results indicate that remittances represent a substantial
part of the savings rate of temporary migrants, while remittances seem to play a
minor role in the context of the savings of permanent migrants. In order to test for
diﬀerences in the distributions between natives and the respective group of migrants,
we carried out Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. In all cases, the null hypothesis that the
distributions are equal could be rejected7.
Table 1 and Figure 1 have shown that a large share of the households in our
sample does not save at all. Therefore, OLS estimations of equation (1) might
result in inconsistent estimates of the parameter vector β. To take the censored
nature of our dependent variable into account, we also estimate equation (1) using












it > 0,i =1 ,...,N, t =1 ,...,T.
The expected value of savings given the observable characteristics (the so called
”unconditional expectation”) consists of the probability of S being uncensored and
the expectation of S given positive savings (the ”conditional expectation”):








7The test results can be obtained by the authors upon request.
11where φ(·) represents the standard normal density function and Φ(·) is the cumula-
tive standard normal density function.
In the Tobit model, one has to diﬀerentiate between the marginal eﬀects of the
latent variable S∗
it and the marginal eﬀects of observable savings Sit. For the latent
variable, the marginal eﬀect is E(S∗
it|Xit)/∂Xit = γ. However, we are particularly






McDonald and Moﬃtt (1980) propose a useful decomposition of this eﬀect into two








E(Sit|Sit > 0,Xit). (4)
The ﬁrst term on the right hand side of equation (4) represents the change in the
expected savings rate of the households with positive savings, weighted by the prob-
ability of having a positive savings rate, and the second term shows the change in the
probability of positive savings, weighted by the expected value of savings if savings
are positive.
Both, the OLS and Tobit estimates may be biased because of unobservable vari-
ables which are correlated with the regressors and aﬀect the dependent variable.
Unobservable future inheritances, for example, may have strong eﬀects on the wealth
accumulation behavior. Cobb-Clark and Hildebrand (2002) argue that there might
exist substantial diﬀerences in social norms and expectations about intergenerational
transfers in diﬀerent countries. Consequently, unobservable factors may also have
diﬀerent eﬀects on savings of foreign-born and native-born individuals. In particu-
lar, they may inﬂuence the decision of immigrants to return to their home country.
12For that reason, we also estimate the OLS and Tobit models (1) and (2) separately
for natives and immigrants with household ﬁxed eﬀects to control for time-invariant
confounding factors, which may appear in the pooled regression models. Speciﬁcally,
we estimate the linear model
Sit = Xitβ + αi + εit, (5)
and the ﬁxed eﬀects Tobit model
S
∗
it = Xitγ + αi + ηit, (6)
with Sit =0i fS∗
it ≤ 0, and Sit = S∗
it if S∗
it > 0, where αi are the household ﬁxed
eﬀects.
3.2 Decomposition Analysis
In order to provide a comprehensive descriptive analysis of the savings behavior of
immigrants relative to natives, we pay particular attention to the isolation of the
part of the savings diﬀerential that can be explained by diﬀerences in socioeconomic
characteristics from the part attributable to diﬀerences in the coeﬃcients, based on
the decomposition method proposed by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973).
For the decomposition analysis we estimate equations (1) and (2) separately for
natives (n) and migrants (m), resulting in the models













13for i =1 ,...,Ng,t =1 ,...,Tg,g =( n,m),

g Ng = N, and

g Tg = T,
respectively. For the linear model (8), Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) propose
the decomposition
Sn − Sm =∆
OLS
nm = Eβn(Sitn|Xitn) − Eβm(Sitm|Xitm)
=[ Eβn(Sitn|Xitn) − Eβn(Sitm|Xitm)]
+[Eβn(Sitm|Xitm) − Eβm(Sitm|Xitm)] (9)
=( Xn − Xm) βn + Xm( βn −  βm),
where Eβg(Sitg|Xitg) for g =( n,m) means that the expected value of Sitg condi-











t=1 Xitg. The ﬁrst term on the right hand side of equation
(10) shows the savings diﬀerential between the two groups due to diﬀerences in char-
acteristics, whereas the second term shows the diﬀerential that is due to diﬀerences
in coeﬃcients. We will interpret the latter as the savings diﬀerence between the two
groups that is due to a diﬀerent savings behavior.
Given the observable socioeconomic characteristics Xitg, the linear model might
be a good approximation to the expected value of savings E(Sitg|Xitg) for values of
Xg which lie close to the mean. However, due to the large number of individuals
who do not save at all, the application of a simple linear regression model may lead
to biased estimates of the parameter vector. Therefore, we aim to provide a similar
decomposition that is based on the results of the Tobit models (9).
Equation (4) indicates that a decomposition of savings disparities similar to
equation (10) is not appropriate if the dependent variable is censored, because the
marginal eﬀects depend on the estimated variance of the error term. For the Tobit
models we therefore propose an alternative decomposition of the mean diﬀerence of
14S between the two groups (n) and (m):
∆
Tobit
nm =[ Eγn,σn(Sitn|Xitn) − Eγn,σm(Sitm|Xitm)]
+[Eγn,σm(Sitm|Xitm) − Eγm,σm(Sitm|Xitm)]. (10)




































t=1 Xitg,g=( n,m).  γg and  σg represent the estimated
parameter vector and the variance of the error term of group g, respectively. Similar
to the decomposition equation of the linear model, the calculation of the counterfac-
tual parts of equation (12) is based on the average characteristics and the estimated
error variance of migrants as well as the estimated coeﬃcients of natives8.
In the following empirical analysis we will report the estimation results from
diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the linear models (1) and (8) and the respective decompo-
sition according to equation (10). To account for the clustering of savings at zero,
we also report the results of estimating diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the Tobit model
(2) and (9) providing for each speciﬁcation the McDonald-Moﬃt decomposition (5)
8In contrast to the decomposition of the OLS model, the Tobit decomposition also requires the
consideration of the error variance in the counterfactual part of the decomposition equation. Conse-
quently, instead of using only the parameter vector of natives, one can also use (
γn
σn) as a counterfac-
tual term in the decomposition equation which results in [Eγn,σn(Sitn|Xitn) − Eγn,σn(Sitm|Xitm)]
+[ Eγn,σn(Sitm|Xitm) − Eγm,σm(Sitm|Xitm)]. Such a speciﬁcation of the decomposition may dif-
fer substantially from (11) if large diﬀerences in the variance of the error term between the two
groups exist. For that reason, we focus our analysis on the estimation of equation (12) because
this decomposition is comparable to the OLS decomposition described in equation (10).
15as well as the results of the Tobit-Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition according to equa-
tions (12). Finally, we report the results of estimating the ﬁxed eﬀects models (6)
and (7) in order to investigate the role of unobserved heterogeneity.
4 Estimation Results
Table 2 reports the results from pooled OLS and Tobit estimates of models (1) and
(2) using a basic speciﬁcation that includes a quadratic function of the age of the
household head, the permanent income of the household measured as the average
household net income over the past ﬁve years, an immigrant dummy, a dummy
variable indicating whether the head of a migrant household intends to return to the
home country, a quadratic function of the years since immigration, and year dummies
as covariates. As described in section 3, we compare three diﬀerent deﬁnitions
of savings. Part A of Table 2 includes the estimates for the savings equivalent,
assuming that remittances are purely altruistic. Remittances of temporary migrants
are considered as being savings in Part B, while remittances of both temporary and
permanent migrants are treated as savings in Part C of Table 2.
Independent of how we treat remittances, there is evidence for a statistically sig-
niﬁcant ’U’-shaped savings rate-age proﬁle. Immigrant households save signiﬁcantly
less than natives. The marginal eﬀect of the unconditional expected value of the
Tobit model presented in Part A indicates that the average household with migra-
tion background saves 2.9 percentage points less than comparable natives if remit-
tances are not taken into account. The McDonald-Moﬃtt-decomposition reported
in columns (2b) and (2c) reveals that the propensity to save at all is 14.4% lower
for permanent immigrant households if compared to native households and that,
conditional on having savings, permanent immigrant households save about 2.1 per-
centage points less than native households. Considering only savings in Germany,
16there does not seem to be a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between immigrant households
who intend to return to their home country and permanent immigrant households.
This picture changes somewhat if one considers the case in which remittances of
migrant households are treated as savings. The estimates presented in Part B show
that diﬀerences between temporary migrants and natives disappear if remittances of
temporary migrants are considered to be part of their savings9. These results conﬁrm
the presumption of Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2002) who argue that they observe
savings disparities between migrants and natives because immigrants transfer parts
of their income to the country of origin. The marginal eﬀect given in Part C reveals,
however, that the savings gap between permanent migrants and natives persists,
even if remittances of permanent migrants are treated as savings. Finally, we do
not ﬁnd strong evidence for a savings assimilation of migrants towards the savings
of otherwise similar natives with time of residence in Germany.
Tables 3 to 5 report the results of an extended speciﬁcation of the models (1)
and (2), where we added explanatory variables summarized in the vector Zit to the
speciﬁcation. Again, we apply the three diﬀerent deﬁnitions of the savings equiva-
lent to examine the relative importance of remittances of temporary and permanent
migrants. In Table 3, remittances are not considered to be part of the dependent
variable, in Table 4 we consider only the remittances of temporary migrant house-
holds as savings, while in Table 5 the remittances of all immigrant households are
treated as savings.
The estimates in the three tables do not diﬀer substantially from each other.
In all cases we ﬁnd an ’U’-shaped savings rate-age proﬁle. The education of the
9In order to examine whether the sum of the coeﬃcients of the immigrant dummy and tem-
porary migrant dummy are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, a χ2-test was applied for the Tobit
estimates. The test results suggest that diﬀerences between temporary migrants and natives be-
come insigniﬁcant if remittances are taken into account.
17household head turns out to have a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect on savings. For
migrant households, the eﬀect of education on savings is signiﬁcantly stronger than
for similar natives. While the signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect of permanent income on the
savings rate is higher for migrant households than for natives if remittances are not
taken into account, it becomes insigniﬁcant as soon as remittances are considered to
be part of the savings rate, indicating that permanent income exhibits similar eﬀects
on the savings rate of migrant and native households once remittances are taken into
account. Interestingly, house owners have higher savings rates than household heads
who do not own a house. An explanation for this may be that we could measure
only gross rather than net savings, since we do not observe the debt of an household.
However, χ2-tests reveal that this eﬀect becomes insigniﬁcant for migrant households
as soon as remittances are treated as savings.
While a child lowers the average savings rate of German households by about
1.5 percentage points, the savings rate of migrant households decreases only by 0.8
percentage points. Taking remittances into account, the coeﬃcient of the interaction
term between the number of children and the migrant dummy becomes insigniﬁcant.
For German households, the savings rate increases by about 3.5 percentage points
if the household head is employed. In all three diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the depen-
dent variable, employed immigrant households save about 2 to 3 percentage points
more than employed German households. Single parent households save about 2.4
percentage points less than other households and there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence
between migrant and native single parent households.
Immigrant households whose head intends to return to the country of origin save
signiﬁcantly more than permanent immigrant households and native households as
soon as remittances are treated as savings (see Tables 4 and 5), while the marginal ef-
fect of return migration in Table 3 is only signiﬁcant at the 10%-level. The marginal
18eﬀect in Table 4 indicates that temporary migrants save (and remit) 6.4 percentage
points more than comparable natives and permanent migrants. Taking also remit-
tances of permanent migrants into account, the intention to return still leads on
average to 3.5 percentage points higher savings per month. Finally, the signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients of years since migration in Table 5 reveal an increase in the savings rate
over time if remittances of both temporary and permanent migrants are considered.
This result indicates that immigrants increase payments to their host country while
staying abroad. However, it is important to note that remittances do not necessarily
represent savings. Especially in the case of immigrants who do not plan to return
to their home country, it may be the case that their payments abroad represent
savings rather than payments to their family. Overall, the results reported in Tables
3 - 5 indicate that migrants increase remittances to their home country with time
of residence in Germany but not savings10.
The results presented in Tables 3 - 5 conﬁrm the ﬁndings of Merkle and Zimmer-
mann (1992), who demonstrate that remigration plans increase remittances but do
not aﬀect migrants’ savings. However, similar to Merkle and Zimmermann (1992)
Tables 3 - 5 do not control for unobservable factors that might be correlated with
the explanatory variables and the savings rate and hence may cause biased estimates
of the parameters. In the context of return migration, especially the existence of
unobservable expectations about the own future economic situation may be corre-
lated with remigration plans and inﬂuence the savings behavior at the same time.
For that reason, we estimate additional OLS and Tobit models with ﬁxed eﬀects to
control for unobservable factors.
10In order to test whether the eﬀect of the migrant dummy and the interaction terms are jointly
signiﬁcant, we carried out adjusted Wald tests and χ2-tests for OLS and Tobit speciﬁcations,
respectively. The p-values of these tests, which are given at the bottom of Tables 3 - 5, indicate
that the coeﬃcients of migrant dummy and interaction terms are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero
in all cases.
19The ﬁxed eﬀects Tobit-estimates presented in Table 6 reveal that return mi-
gration does not only aﬀect remittances but also savings in the host country. On
average, the savings rate of temporary migrants is 0.9 percentage points higher than
the savings rate of natives and permanent migrants. In addition, while the marginal
eﬀect of employment in the ﬁxed eﬀects model is lower for Germans and immigrants
than in the pooled model, the eﬀect of permanent income on savings turns out to
be underestimated in the pooled model for German natives and overestimated for
immigrants. Moreover, single parent migrant households who intend to return to
their country of origin save signiﬁcantly more than permanent migrants and German
natives if their remittances are taken into account.
In order to distinguish the part of the savings gap that can be explained by
socioeconomic characteristics from the part attributable to diﬀerences in the savings
behavior, we apply an Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition based on the results of OLS
and Tobit estimations. The ﬁndings of the decomposition analysis are presented in
Table 7. The underlying OLS and Tobit estimates are reported in Tables A3 and
A4.
When remittances are not taken into account, the observed savings gap between
native and permanent immigrant households amounts to 3.2% and the observed
diﬀerence between natives and temporary immigrant households is 2.1%. Treating
all remittances as savings, the observed diﬀerence between natives and permanent
migrants decreases to 1.6%, while the savings gap between natives and temporary
migrants becomes even negative (-2.3%).
The Tobit decomposition of the diﬀerences in the savings rates between natives
and permanent migrants presented in Part A shows that about 60% of the savings
gap can be explained by observable factors when remittances are not considered as
being savings, while 40% can be attributed to a diﬀerent savings behavior. The
20comparison of natives and temporary migrants in Part A suggests that the part
of the diﬀerences in the savings rates attributable to observable characteristics is
around 80% and that temporary migrants appear to be somewhat more similar to
natives than permanent migrants. The decomposition of the OLS model indicates
that even more than 100% of the predicted diﬀerence between natives and tem-
porary migrants is attributable to observable characteristics. The negative part of
the savings diﬀerential attributable to diﬀerences in the savings behavior may be
interpreted as a higher preference of immigrants to save11.
Part B of Table 7 shows the results of the decomposition analysis when we treat
all remittances as savings. The decomposition of the OLS model and the Tobit
model shows that even more than 100% of the savings disparities between permanent
migrants and natives can be explained by observable factors. These ﬁndings indi-
cate that permanent migrants have higher preferences towards savings than natives.
However, it is possible that we observe this result because remittances of permanent
migrants reﬂect payments to family members abroad rather than savings. Taking
remittances into account, the predicted diﬀerence between natives and temporary
migrants becomes negative. Consequently, the major part of the negative diﬀerence
between native and immigrant households can be explained by diﬀerences in the
savings behavior. Overall, we conclude from the decomposition analysis that the
savings gap between native and immigrant households is predominantly caused by
diﬀerences in observable characteristics, such as age, education, permanent income,
and the number of children, rather than diﬀerences in the savings behavior.
11See Neuman and Oaxaca (1998) for a similar interpretation.
215 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the relative savings position of temporary and permanent mi-
grants in West Germany. Our results show that immigrants save signiﬁcantly less
than natives. On average, household heads with a migration background save 2.9
percentage points less than comparable natives if remittances are not taken into
account. However, we ﬁnd that temporary migrants save signiﬁcantly more than
permanent migrants and natives as soon as remittances are treated as savings. The
ﬁxed eﬀects estimates further indicate that independent of how remittances are
treated, immigrants who intend to return to their country of origin save signiﬁ-
cantly more than immigrants who plan to stay in Germany permanently.
Considering the eﬀects of additional determinants of the savings rate, we ﬁnd
no evidence for an adjustment of savings in the host country between immigrants
and natives. However, our ﬁndings reveal that immigrants increase payments to
their host country with time since migration. Since remittances do not necessarily
represent savings, these results do not provide evidence for an increase of migrants’
savings over time. Especially in the case of migrants who do not intend to return
to their country of origin, remittances may represent payments to family members
abroad rather than savings. Consequently, since we do not ﬁnd an assimilation
process of savings in the host country and only weak evidence for increasing savings
rates abroad, our ﬁndings indicate deﬁcits in the long-term integration of permanent
migrants in Germany.
Finally, the results of a decomposition analysis indicate that diﬀerences in the
savings rate between native and immigrant households can mainly be attributed to
diﬀerences in observable socioeconomic characteristics rather than diﬀerences in the
savings behavior.
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25Table 1: Descriptive Statistics – Savings and Remittances (S & R)
Germans Immigrants Permanent Migrants Temporary Migrants
Variable Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E.
1996
Savings 221.282 10.754 139.587 14.008 133.238 19.456 149.254 19.343
No Savings 0.377 0.013 0.550 0.025 0.567 0.032 0.523 0.041
Savings Equivalent 154.468 8.394 84.426 8.025 75.705 10.525 97.703 12.344
S&RI 154.468 8.394 103.177 9.033 75.705 10.525 145.005 15.836
S&RI I 154.468 8.394 116.438 9.270 97.675 11.228 145.005 15.836
Savings Rate 0.089 0.003 0.064 0.005 0.057 0.006 0.075 0.008
S & R Rate I 0.089 0.003 0.087 0.008 0.057 0.006 0.131 0.017
S & R Rate II 0.089 0.003 0.101 0.008 0.080 0.008 0.131 0.017
Net Income 2065.664 33.409 1778.137 57.575 1801.883 80.799 1741.981 76.478
Observations 2697 822 476 346
1997
Savings 214.495 9.898 129.616 11.274 115.909 14.337 149.524 18.152
No Savings 0.393 0.014 0.534 0.026 0.547 0.033 0.515 0.041
Savings Equivalent 151.285 8.368 78.595 7.854 70.217 9.368 90.764 13.633
S&RI 151.285 8.368 111.258 11.657 70.217 9.368 170.867 24.122
S&RI I 151.285 8.368 122.310 11.720 88.877 9.873 170.867 24.122
Savings Rate 0.088 0.003 0.060 0.004 0.054 0.005 0.068 0.007
S & R Rate I 0.088 0.003 0.090 0.009 0.054 0.005 0.143 0.019
S & R Rate II 0.088 0.003 0.101 0.009 0.072 0.006 0.143 0.019
Net Income 2086.303 33.126 1758.931 46.751 1684.625 57.407 1866.855 78.188
Observations 2734 783 453 330
1998
Savings 220.302 14.627 140.225 16.919 126.194 20.800 165.913 28.739
No Savings 0.383 0.013 0.561 0.027 0.566 0.033 0.551 0.045
Savings Equivalent 151.335 8.438 86.188 10.329 78.899 13.016 99.534 16.826
S&RI 151.335 8.438 102.583 13.316 78.899 13.016 145.942 28.581
S&RI I 151.335 8.438 118.745 13.927 103.889 14.666 145.942 28.581
Savings Rate 0.085 0.003 0.062 0.006 0.058 0.007 0.071 0.012
S & R Rate I 0.085 0.003 0.077 0.010 0.058 0.007 0.113 0.025
S & R Rate II 0.085 0.003 0.092 0.011 0.081 0.010 0.113 0.025
Net Income 2119.118 34.801 1834.534 54.083 1745.431 63.675 1997.657 95.893
Observations 3090 737 453 284
1999
Savings 231.046 13.479 174.578 25.827 153.709 19.707 224.755 74.045
No Savings 0.381 0.012 0.533 0.029 0.517 0.036 0.573 0.049
Savings Equivalent 157.855 8.145 103.535 14.634 90.071 11.540 135.908 41.412
S&RI 157.855 8.145 121.000 16.630 90.071 11.540 195.368 48.989
S&RI I 157.855 8.145 139.372 17.902 116.083 15.215 195.368 48.989
Savings Rate 0.086 0.003 0.067 0.007 0.066 0.008 0.070 0.012
S & R Rate I 0.086 0.003 0.082 0.008 0.066 0.008 0.122 0.018
S & R Rate II 0.086 0.003 0.100 0.011 0.090 0.014 0.122 0.018
Net Income 2210.641 37.315 1913.927 64.721 1859.737 64.313 2044.224 156.238
Observations 3104 682 459 223
2000
Savings 232.815 6.475 148.889 15.422 124.740 14.385 210.726 39.950
No Savings 0.360 0.008 0.547 0.023 0.537 0.028 0.572 0.044
Savings Equivalent 165.554 4.868 90.180 9.442 73.297 8.493 133.411 25.189
S&RI 165.554 4.868 107.065 11.402 73.297 8.493 193.532 32.973
S&RI I 165.554 4.868 115.805 11.435 85.451 8.673 193.532 32.973
Savings Rate 0.090 0.001 0.056 0.004 0.051 0.004 0.070 0.010
S & R Rate I 0.090 0.001 0.069 0.005 0.051 0.004 0.115 0.016
S & R Rate II 0.090 0.001 0.078 0.005 0.063 0.004 0.115 0.016
Net Income 2198.975 23.779 1952.786 54.183 1897.237 52.792 2095.027 137.682
Observations 5901 905 652 253
26Table 1 Continued: Descriptive Statistics – Savings and Remittances
Germans Immigrants Permanent Migrants Temporary Migrants
Variable Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E.
2001
Savings 228.788 6.791 149.781 16.760 128.169 16.377 202.390 40.877
No Savings 0.367 0.009 0.565 0.025 0.562 0.028 0.572 0.054
Savings Equivalent 162.374 4.969 90.146 10.563 73.633 8.684 130.344 28.877
S&RI 162.374 4.969 102.444 11.011 73.633 8.684 172.578 30.190
S&RI I 162.374 4.969 114.206 11.025 90.226 8.947 172.578 30.190
Savings Rate 0.086 0.002 0.056 0.005 0.050 0.004 0.072 0.015
S & R Rate I 0.086 0.002 0.066 0.006 0.050 0.004 0.104 0.017
S & R Rate II 0.086 0.002 0.077 0.006 0.066 0.005 0.104 0.017
Net Income 2252.628 24.866 1994.905 58.826 1948.264 57.507 2108.444 146.782
Observations 5225 849 611 238
2002
Savings 230.324 8.209 135.176 13.699 132.072 15.599 146.579 28.788
No Savings 0.385 0.009 0.580 0.026 0.578 0.030 0.589 0.049
Savings Equivalent 164.616 6.162 82.682 8.396 79.684 9.200 93.698 20.068
S&RI 164.616 6.162 89.052 8.567 79.684 9.200 123.470 21.575
S&RI I 164.616 6.162 101.097 9.927 95.007 11.223 123.470 21.575
Savings Rate 0.082 0.002 0.051 0.004 0.051 0.005 0.052 0.007
S & R Rate I 0.082 0.002 0.056 0.004 0.051 0.005 0.075 0.010
S & R Rate II 0.082 0.002 0.068 0.007 0.066 0.008 0.075 0.010
Net Income 2326.082 26.300 2005.295 58.580 1982.125 67.052 2090.412 118.863
Observations 4993 833 626 207
2003
Savings 228.400 7.632 129.073 16.033 117.656 17.003 183.991 41.552
No Savings 0.402 0.010 0.574 0.029 0.606 0.031 0.419 0.068
Savings Equivalent 163.972 5.720 84.140 11.577 73.931 11.155 133.245 36.860
S&RI 163.972 5.720 94.994 14.885 73.931 11.155 196.306 59.585
S&RI I 163.972 5.720 109.346 15.246 91.267 12.155 196.306 59.585
Savings Rate 0.081 0.002 0.051 0.005 0.045 0.004 0.083 0.022
S & R Rate I 0.081 0.002 0.057 0.008 0.045 0.004 0.119 0.036
S & R Rate II 0.081 0.002 0.070 0.008 0.059 0.006 0.119 0.036
Net Income 2407.283 29.212 2007.553 73.796 1990.266 79.243 2090.703 198.178
Observations 4756 774 603 171
1996-2003
Savings 225.919 6.577 143.363 10.322 129.169 10.284 176.296 18.703
No Savings 0.381 0.007 0.556 0.014 0.561 0.016 0.543 0.024
Savings Equivalent 158.930 4.778 87.425 5.987 77.091 6.164 111.403 11.976
S&RI 158.930 4.778 103.766 6.963 77.091 6.164 165.655 16.313
S&RI I 158.930 4.778 116.958 7.176 95.969 6.737 165.655 16.313
Savings Rate 0.086 0.001 0.058 0.003 0.054 0.003 0.070 0.005
S & R Rate I 0.086 0.001 0.073 0.004 0.054 0.003 0.118 0.010
S & R Rate II 0.086 0.001 0.086 0.004 0.072 0.004 0.118 0.010
Net Income 2208.139 22.655 1906.692 37.611 1875.564 38.280 1978.913 66.397
Observations 32500 6385 4333 2052
27Table 2: Savings Gap and Performance of Immigrants: Natives and Immigrants, 1996-2003
(1) (2) (2a) (2b) (2c)




Age (Yrs.) -0.006 -0.008 -0.004 -0.003 -0.020
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.003)***
Age2 × 10−3 0.071 0.094 0.056 0.039 0.239
(0.010)*** (0.016)*** (0.009)*** (0.006)*** (0.040)***
Immigrant -0.020 -0.055 -0.029 -0.021 -0.144
(0.010)** (0.019)*** (0.009)*** (0.006)*** (0.049)***
Immigrant × Return Migration 0.014 0.019 0.011 0.008 0.047
(0.006)** (0.012) (0.007) (0.005) (0.028)*
Immigrant × YSM×10−2 0.040 0.202 0.120 0.084 0.515
(0.115) (0.228) (0.135) (0.095) (0.581)
Immigrant × YSM2 × 10−2 -0.002 -0.007 -0.004 -0.002 -0.018
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.014)
Permanent Income×10−3 0.026 0.044 0.026 0.113 0.019
(0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.002)*** (0.007)*** (0.001)***
Constant 0.145 0.097
(0.017)*** (0.028)***
R2 / Wald statistic (χ2) 0.080 387.85
Part B
Age (Yrs.) -0.006 -0.008 -0.004 -0.003 -0.019
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.003)***
Age2 × 10−3 0.070 0.092 0.054 0.038 0.226
(0.010)*** (0.016)*** (0.009)*** (0.006)*** (0.040)***
Immigrant -0.027 -0.068 -0.035 -0.025 -0.170
(0.012)** (0.021)*** (0.009)*** (0.007)*** (0.052)***
Immigrant × Return Migration 0.061 0.092 0.063 0.044 0.201
(0.011)*** (0.016)*** (0.012)*** (0.008)*** (0.028)***
Immigrant × YSM×10−2 0.103 0.325 0.192 0.135 0.797
(0.136) (0.244) (0.144) (0.101) (0.598)
Immigrant × YSM2 × 10−2 -0.003 -0.009 -0.005 -0.003 -0.023
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.014)
Permanent Income×10−3 0.026 0.044 0.026 0.109 0.018
(0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.002)*** (0.007)*** (0.001)***
Constant 0.142 0.089
(0.017)*** (0.029)***
R2 / Wald statistic (χ2) 0.074 379.65
Part C
Age (Yrs.) -0.006 -0.008 -0.004 -0.003 -0.018
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.003)***
Age2 × 10−3 0.068 0.089 0.052 0.037 0.214
(0.010)*** (0.016)*** (0.009)*** (0.006)*** (0.039)***
Immigrant -0.020 -0.043 -0.023 -0.016 -0.104
(0.014) (0.022)** (0.011)** (0.008)** (0.053)*
Immigrant × Return Migration 0.041 0.056 0.036 0.025 0.128
(0.012)*** (0.016)*** (0.011)*** (0.008)*** (0.033)***
Immigrant × YSM×10−2 0.233 0.445 0.265 0.186 1.075
(0.167) (0.266)* (0.158)* (0.111)* (0.642)*
Immigrant × YSM2 × 10−2 -0.006 -0.012 -0.007 -0.005 -0.029
(0.004)* (0.006)** (0.003)** (0.002)** (0.015)**
Permanent Income×10−3 0.026 0.044 0.026 0.107 0.019
(0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.002)*** (0.007)*** (0.001)***
Constant 0.138 0.081
(0.017)*** (0.029)***
R2 / Wald statistic (χ2) 0.067 302.51
Notes: * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%. Weighted OLS and weighted Tobit using
weights provided by the GSOEP. Observations: 38,885. Standard errors, which are reported in parentheses, are
adjusted in order to take repeated observations of households into account. The regression further includes 7 year
dummies.
28Table 3: Determinants of the Savings Rate: Natives and Immigrants, 1996-2003
(1) (2) (2a) (2b) (2c)
OLS Tobit Marginal Eﬀects
Uncond. Prob. Cond.
Exp. Uncens. Uncens.
Age (Yrs.) -0.006 -0.010 -0.005 -0.025 -0.004
(0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.004)*** (0.001)***
Age2 × 10−3 0.070 0.116 0.069 0.306 0.048
(0.012)*** (0.019)*** (0.011)*** (0.049)*** (0.007)***
Education (Yrs.) 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.014 0.002
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.0004)***
Permanent Income×10−3 0.022 0.033 0.019 0.087 0.013
(0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.002)*** (0.009)*** (0.001)***
Owner of House 0.014 0.025 0.015 0.066 0.010
(0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.003)*** (0.014)*** (0.002)***
Number of Children -0.018 -0.025 -0.014 -0.066 -0.010
(0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.001)*** (0.007)*** (0.001)***
Employed 0.027 0.062 0.035 0.166 0.025
(0.004)*** (0.006)*** (0.003)*** (0.015)*** (0.002)***
Single Parent Household -0.013 -0.043 -0.023 -0.115 -0.016
(0.004)*** (0.008)*** (0.004)*** (0.021)*** (0.002)***
Immigrant -0.020 -0.004 -0.002 -0.011 -0.001
(0.037) (0.075) (0.044) (0.199) (0.031)
Immigrant × Age (Yrs.) -0.002 -0.008 -0.004 -0.022 -0.003
(0.002) (0.004)* (0.002)* (0.011)* (0.001)*
Immigrant × Age2 × 10−3 0.022 0.088 0.052 0.232 0.037
(0.026) (0.051)* (0.030)* (0.135)* (0.021)*
Immigrant × Education (Yrs.) 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.014 0.002
(0.001)* (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.005)*** (0.001)***
Immigrant × Permanent Income×10−3 0.005 0.023 0.013 0.060 0.009
(0.005) (0.007)*** (0.004)*** (0.018)*** (0.002)***
Immigrant × Owner of House -0.008 -0.020 -0.011 -0.052 -0.007
(0.008) (0.013) (0.007) (0.036) (0.005)
Immigrant × Number of Children 0.011 0.011 0.006 0.030 0.004
(0.004)*** (0.006)** (0.003)** (0.014)** (0.002)**
Immigrant × Employed 0.007 0.033 0.020 0.083 0.014
(0.006) (0.012)*** (0.008)** (0.030)*** (0.005)**
Immigrant × Single Parent Household 0.007 0.027 0.017 0.070 0.012
(0.008) (0.018) (0.011) (0.043) (0.008)
Immigrant ×Return Migration 0.014 0.019 0.011 0.050 0.008
(0.006)** (0.011)* (0.006)* (0.026)* (0.004)*
Immigrant × YSM×10−2 0.133 0.321 0.192 0.850 0.135
(0.111) (0.244) (0.146) (0.645) (0.103)
Immigrant × YSM2 × 10−2 -0.004 -0.009 -0.005 -0.022 -0.003




R2 / Wald statistic (χ2) 0.129 1095.58
Interaction terms: F-value / χ2-value 3.26 72.74
Notes: See notes to Table 2.
29Table 4: Determinants of the Savings Rate, including Remittances of Temporary Migrants (based
on Savings and Remittances I): Natives and Immigrants, 1996-2003
(1) (2) (2a) (2b) (2c)
OLS Tobit Marginal Eﬀects
Uncond. Prob. Cond.
Exp. Uncens. Uncens.
Age (Yrs.) -0.006 -0.010 -0.005 -0.025 -0.004
(0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.004)*** (0.001)***
Age2 × 10−3 0.070 0.118 0.069 0.299 0.049
(0.012)*** (0.019)*** (0.011)*** (0.048)*** (0.007)***
Education (Yrs.) 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.013 0.002
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.0004)***
Permanent Income×10−3 0.022 0.034 0.019 0.085 0.014
(0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.002)*** (0.009)*** (0.001)***
Owner of House 0.014 0.026 0.015 0.064 0.010
(0.004)*** (0.006)*** (0.003)*** (0.013)*** (0.002)***
Number of Children -0.018 -0.025 -0.015 -0.064 -0.010
(0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.001)*** (0.007)*** (0.001)***
Employed 0.027 0.064 0.035 0.164 0.025
(0.004)*** (0.006)*** (0.003)*** (0.015)*** (0.002)***
Single Parent Household -0.013 -0.044 -0.024 -0.113 -0.017
(0.004)*** (0.008)*** (0.004)*** (0.021)*** (0.002)***
Immigrant -0.062 -0.077 -0.039 -0.198 -0.028
(0.052) (0.091) (0.039) (0.230) (0.029)
Immigrant × Age (Yrs.) -0.001 -0.005 -0.003 -0.013 -0.002
(0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.011) (0.001)
Immigrant × Age2 × 10−3 0.007 0.059 0.035 0.150 0.024
(0.029) (0.053) (0.031) (0.133) (0.022)
Immigrant × Education (Yrs.) 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.015 0.002
(0.002)* (0.002)** (0.001)** (0.006)*** (0.001)**
Immigrant × Permanent Income×10−3 -0.002 0.012 0.007 0.030 0.004
(0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.023) (0.003)
Immigrant × Owner of House -0.012 -0.024 -0.013 -0.063 -0.009
(0.009) (0.014)* (0.007)* (0.036)* (0.005)*
Immigrant × Number of Children 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.017 0.002
(0.004)* (0.006) (0.003) (0.015) (0.002)
Immigrant × Employed 0.020 0.045 0.028 0.108 0.020
(0.009)** (0.015)*** (0.010)*** (0.035)*** (0.007)***
Immigrant × Single Parent Household 0.003 0.020 0.012 0.050 0.008
(0.009) (0.018) (0.011) (0.044) (0.008)
Immigrant ×Return Migration 0.060 0.093 0.064 0.208 0.045
(0.011)*** (0.015)*** (0.011)*** (0.026)*** (0.008)***
Immigrant × YSM×10−2 0.223 0.498 0.295 1.265 0.208
(0.141) (0.266)* (0.158)* (0.677)* (0.111)*
Immigrant × YSM2 × 10−2 -0.006 -0.012 -0.007 -0.031 -0.005




R2 / Wald statistic (χ2) 0.121 950.44
Interaction terms: F-value / χ2-value 4.66 87.39
Notes: See notes to Table 2.
30Table 5: Determinants of the Savings Rate, including Remittances of Temporary and Permanent
Migrants (based on Savings and Remittances II): Natives and Immigrants, 1996-2003
(1) (2) (2a) (2b) (2c)
OLS Tobit Marginal Eﬀects
Uncond. Prob. Cond.
Exp. Uncens. Uncens.
Age (Yrs.) -0.006 -0.010 -0.005 -0.025 -0.004
(0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.004)*** (0.001)***
Age2 × 10−3 0.070 0.118 0.070 0.296 0.049
(0.012)*** (0.019)*** (0.011)*** (0.048)*** (0.007)***
Education (Yrs.) 0.004 0.006 0.003 0.013 0.002
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.0004)***
Permanent Income×10−3 0.022 0.034 0.020 0.084 0.014
(0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.002)*** (0.009)*** (0.001)***
Owner of House 0.014 0.026 0.015 0.064 0.010
(0.004)*** (0.006)*** (0.003)*** (0.013)*** (0.002)***
Number of Children -0.018 -0.025 -0.015 -0.063 -0.010
(0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.001)*** (0.007)*** (0.001)***
Employed 0.027 0.065 0.036 0.163 0.025
(0.004)*** (0.006)*** (0.003)*** (0.015)*** (0.002)***
Single Parent Household -0.013 -0.044 -0.024 -0.113 -0.017
(0.004)*** (0.008)*** (0.004)*** (0.021)*** (0.003)***
Immigrant -0.084 -0.118 -0.056 -0.296 -0.041
(0.058) (0.093) (0.033)* (0.219) (0.027)
Immigrant × Age (Yrs.) 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001
(0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.011) (0.001)
Immigrant × Age2 × 10−3 -0.005 0.017 0.010 0.043 0.007
(0.034) (0.055) (0.032) (0.138) (0.023)
Immigrant × Education (Yrs.) 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.014 0.002
(0.002)* (0.002)** (0.001)** (0.005)** (0.001)**
Immigrant × Permanent Income×10−3 -0.004 0.005 0.003 0.013 0.002
(0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.022) (0.003)
Immigrant × Owner of House -0.020 -0.038 -0.020 -0.096 -0.014
(0.010)* (0.015)** (0.007)*** (0.039)** (0.005)***
Immigrant × Number of Children 0.007 0.009 0.005 0.021 0.003
(0.004)* (0.007) (0.003) (0.016) (0.002)
Immigrant × Employed 0.029 0.046 0.029 0.110 0.020
(0.010)*** (0.015)*** (0.010)*** (0.033)*** (0.007)***
Immigrant × Single Parent Household -0.007 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.001
(0.010) (0.019) (0.011) (0.048) (0.008)
Immigrant ×Return Migration 0.040 0.054 0.035 0.128 0.025
(0.011)*** (0.015)*** (0.010)*** (0.031)*** (0.007)***
Immigrant × YSM×10−2 0.350 0.620 0.370 1.552 0.260
(0.166)** (0.275)** (0.164)** (0.686)** (0.115)**
Immigrant × YSM2 × 10−2 -0.008 -0.015 -0.009 -0.037 -0.006




R2 / Wald statistic (χ2) 0.114 904.05
Interaction terms: F-value / χ2-value 3.72 60.46




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































32Table 7: Decomposition Analysis
Natives vs. Natives vs.
Permanent Migrants Temporary Migrants
A: Savings Rate
Observed Diﬀerence in Savings Rate:
E(Sn) − E(Sm) 0.032 0.021
OLS Estimates
Predicted Diﬀerence in Savings Rate: 0.032 (100.0%) 0.018 (100.0%)
Component:
Diﬀerence in Characteristics:
(Xn − Xm)bn 0.023 (73.5%) 0.024 (136.6%)
Diﬀerence in Coeﬃcients:
Xm(bn − bm) 0.008 (26.5%) -0.007 (-36.6%)
Tobit Estimates
Predicted Diﬀerence in Savings Rate: 0.037 (100.0%) 0.023 (100.0%)
Component:
Diﬀerence in Characteristics:
Eγn,σn(Sitn|Xitn) − Eγn,σm(Sitm|Xitm) 0.022 (60.4%) 0.018 (79.7%)
Diﬀerence in Coeﬃcients:
Eγn,σm(Sitm|Xitm) − Eγm,σm(Sitm|Xitm) 0.015 (39.6%) 0.005 (20.3%)
B: Savings and Remittances Rate
Observed Diﬀerence in Savings Rate:
E(Sn) − E(Sm) 0.016 -0.023
OLS Estimates
Predicted Diﬀerence in Savings Rate: 0.014 (100.0%) -0.027 (100.0%)
Component:
Diﬀerence in Characteristics:
(Xn − Xm)bn 0.019 (140.4%) 0.017 (-61.9%)
Diﬀerence in Coeﬃcients:
Xm(bn − bm) -0.006 (-40.4%) -0.044 (161.9%)
Tobit Estimates
Predicted Diﬀerence in Savings Rate: 0.015 (100.0%) -0.037 (100.0%)
Component:
Diﬀerence in Characteristics:
Eγn,σn(Sitn|Xitn) − Eγn,σm(Sitm|Xitm) 0.022 (148.1%) 0.018 (-48.4%)
Diﬀerence in Coeﬃcients:
Eγn,σm(Sitm|Xitm) − Eγm,σm(Sitm|Xitm) -0.007 (-48.1%) -0.055 (148.4%)
33Appendix
Table A1: Deﬁnition of Variables
Variable Description
Savings Monthly amount of savings (in real 2000 Euro) for larger purchases, emergencies or wealth
accumulation.
No Savings 1 if respondent does not save money; 0 otherwise.
Remittances I Average monthly amount of payments (in real 2000 Euro) to relatives and / or other
persons abroad if respondent immigrated to Germany and does
not want to remain in Germany forever; 0 otherwise.
Remittances II Average monthly amount of payments (in real 2000 Euro) to relatives and / or other
persons abroad if respondent immigrated to Germany; 0 otherwise.




Savings and Remittances Equivalent I Savings Equivalent + Remittances I.
Savings and Remittances Equivalent II Savings Equivalent + Remittances II.
Income Equivalent Household Net Income/
√
Household Size.
Savings Rate Savings Equivalent/Income Equivalent.
S & R Rate I Savings Equivalent + Remittances I/Income Equivalent.
S & R Rate II Savings Equivalent + Remittances II/Income Equivalent.
Household Net Income Currently monthly household net income (in real 2000 Euro).
Age Age of respondent in years.
Education Education of respondent in years.
Single Parent Household 1 if respondent is not married and number of children in household > 0;
0 otherwise.
Number of Children Number of children respondent received child allowance for (previous year).
Employed 1 if respondent currently works full-time or part-time; 0 otherwise.
Permanent Income Average household net income (in real 2000 Euro) over the last ﬁve years.
Owner of House 1 if respondent owns house and / or apartment; 0 otherwise.
Immigrant 1 if respondent immigrated to Germany since 1948; 0 otherwise.
Return Migration Intended return migration: 1 if immigrant wishes to return to the country
of origin; 0 otherwise.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































36Table A4: Determinants of the Savings and Remittances Rate: Permanent Migrants and
Temporary Migrants – Pooled Estimation, 1996-2003
(1) (2) (2a) (3) (4) (4a)
Permanent Migrants Temporary Migrants
OLS Tobit marg. Eﬀect OLS Tobit marg. Eﬀect
Age (Yrs.) -0.005 -0.012 -0.006 -0.005 -0.015 -0.007
(0.003)* (0.005)** (0.002)** (0.006) (0.012) (0.005)
Age2 × 10−3 0.062 0.143 0.069 0.060 0.178 0.090
(0.034)* (0.060)** (0.028)** (0.065) (0.126) (0.061)
Education (Yrs.) 0.006 0.011 0.005 0.009 0.018 0.008
(0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.003)** (0.006)*** (0.003)***
Permanent Income×10−3 0.025 0.059 0.028 0.012 0.049 0.024
(0.005)*** (0.008)*** (0.004)*** (0.013) (0.018)*** (0.008)***
Owner of House -0.002 -0.011 -0.005 -0.013 -0.026 -0.012
(0.010) (0.017) (0.007) (0.020) (0.037) (0.017)
Number of Children -0.005 -0.008 -0.003 -0.023 -0.044 -0.022
(0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.007)*** (0.015)*** (0.007)***
Employed 0.041 0.106 0.047 0.087 0.183 0.085
(0.007)*** (0.015)*** (0.006)*** (0.024)*** (0.048)*** (0.019)***
Single Parent Household -0.020 -0.046 -0.020 0.007 0.003 0.001
(0.008)** (0.022)** (0.008)** (0.021) (0.047) (0.023)
Constant 0.028 -0.071 0.038 -0.072
(0.047) (0.091) (0.155) (0.264)
Observations 4333 4333 2052 2052
R2 / Wald statistic (χ2) 0.113 194.65 0.074 52.73
Notes: See notes to Table A3.
37